Value stocks are more exposed to disaster risk than growth stocks. Embedding disasters into an investment model induces strong nonlinearity in the pricing kernel. Our single-factor model reproduces the failure of the CAPM in explaining the value premium in finite samples in which disasters are not materialized, and its relative success in samples in which disasters are materialized. Due to measurement errors in pre-ranking market betas, the relation between these estimated betas and average returns is flat in simulations, consistent with the beta "anomaly," even though the relation between true betas and expected returns is strongly positive. Evidence in the long U.S. sample from 1926 to 2014 supports the model's key predictions.
Introduction
Despite similar market betas, firms with high book-to-market equity (value firms) earn higher average stock returns than firms with low book-to-market equity (growth firms). This stylized fact is commonly referred to as the value premium puzzle. In particular, in the U.S. sample from July 1963 to June 2014, the average return of the high-minus-low book-to-market decile (the value premium) is 0.51% per month (t = 2.75). However, its market beta is only 0.01 (t = 0.07), giving rise to an alpha of 0.51% (t = 2.26) in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). However, this evidence is specific to the post-1963 sample, and the CAPM captures the value premium in the long sample (Ang and Chen 2007) . From July 1926 to June 2014, the value premium is on average 0.52% per month (t = 2.60), its CAPM alpha is 0.23% (t = 1.18), and its market beta is 0.45 (t = 3.52).
We ask whether incorporating rare disasters helps explain the value premium puzzle. To this end, we embed disasters into a standard investment-based asset pricing model. The resulting model features three key ingredients, including rare but severe declines in aggregate consumption and productivity growth, asymmetric adjustment costs, and recursive preferences. We calibrate the model parameters to match the disaster moments estimated from a historical, cross-country panel dataset (Nakamura, Steinsson, Barro and Ursua 2013) . We quantify the model's properties on simulated samples in which disasters are not realized, as well as on samples in which disasters are realized.
We report two new insights. First, the investment model with disasters succeeds in explaining the failure of the CAPM in capturing the value premium in finite samples in which disasters are not materialized, as well as its relative success in samples in which disasters are materialized. Intuitively, with asymmetric adjustment costs, when a disaster hits, value firms are burdened with more unproductive capital, and find it more difficult to reduce capital than growth firms. As such, value firms are more exposed to the disaster risk than growth firms. Combined with higher marginal utilities of the representative household in disasters, the model implies a sizeable value premium.
More important, the disaster risk induces strong nonlinearity in the pricing kernel, making the linear CAPM a poor empirical proxy for the pricing kernel. When disasters are not realized in a finite sample, estimated market betas only measure the weak covariation of the value-minus-growth returns with market excess returns during normal times. However, the value premium is primarily driven by the higher exposures of value stocks to disasters than growth stocks. Consequently, the CAPM fails to explain the value premium in normal times. In contrast, when disasters are realized, the estimated market betas provide an adequate account for the large covariation between the value-minus-growth returns and the pricing kernel. As such, the CAPM captures the value premium in finite samples with disasters. In all, disasters explain the value premium puzzle.
Second, the investment model with disasters is also consistent with the beta anomaly that the empirical relation between market betas and average returns is too flat to be consistent with the CAPM. We confirm this flat relation in both the post-1963 sample and the long sample. More important, we show that the investment model explains the beta "anomaly." In simulated samples both with and without disasters, sorting on pre-ranking market betas yields average return spreads that are small and insignificant, post-ranking beta spreads that are economically large and significantly positive, and CAPM alpha spreads that are economically large and often significantly negative.
The crux is that estimated market betas are a poor proxy for true betas. Intuitively, based on prior 60-month rolling windows, pre-ranking betas are average betas over the prior five years.
In contrast, true betas accurately reflect changes in aggregate and firm-specific conditions. In simulations, true betas often mean-revert within a given rolling window, giving rise to negative correlations with rolling betas, especially in samples without disasters. However, while the realizations of disasters make rolling betas more aligned with true betas, the beta anomaly persists even in the disaster samples, a testimony to the importance of beta measurement errors in asset pricing tests.
Early investment studies explain the value premium within models with only one aggregate shock. Zhang (2005) shows that asymmetric adjustment costs cause assets in place harder to reduce, and therefore riskier than growth options, especially in bad times. Cooper (2006) accounts for the value premium within a real options model with nonconvex adjustment costs and investment irreversibility. Tuzel (2010) constructs a two-capital model with real estate and other capital, and shows that firms with higher real estate are riskier because real estate depreciates more slowly. 1 Alas, a limitation of these models is that the CAPM roughly holds in that the CAPM alpha of the valueminus-growth decile is too small relative to that in the post-1963 sample. Several recent studies try to break the tight link between the pricing kernel and the market portfolio by introducing multiple aggregate shocks. Although successful in explaining the failure of the CAPM in the post-1963 sample, these models seem at odds with the long-sample evidence. We contribute to the investment literature by failing the CAPM via disaster-induced nonlinearity within a single-shock structure.
We also contribute to the disaster literature, which relies on disasters to explain the equity premium puzzle, so far mostly in endowment economies. 2 An important exception is Gourio (2012) , who embeds disasters into a production economy to jointly explain the equity premium and business cycles. We differ by studying the impact of disasters on the cross section of expected returns.
In particular, we integrate the disaster literature with investment-based asset pricing, and show how incorporating disasters enables the investment model to explain the failure of the CAPM.
Finally, we emphasize that beta measurement errors have a long history in empirical finance.
For instance, Miller and Scholes (1972) simulate random returns from the CAPM, and find that test results on simulated data are consistent with those from the real data. 3 We add to this body of evidence by quantifying the importance of measurement errors in the context of the beta anomaly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the stylized facts. Section 3 1 Jones and Tuzel (2013) show that a similar two-capital model also explains the inventory-return relation. 2 Barro (2006 Barro ( , 2009 revives the idea of Rietz (1988) , by calibrating the disaster model to a long, cross-country panel dataset. Gabaix (2012) uses time-varying exposures of cash flow to disasters, and Wachter (2013) uses time-varying disaster probability to explain time-varying risk premiums. In an endowment economy with multiple assets, Martin (2013) shows that return correlations arise endogenously and spike at times of disaster.
3 Miller and Scholes (1972) conclude: "We have shown that much of the seeming conflict between [the empirical] results and the almost exactly contrary predictions of the underlying economic theory may simply be artifacts of the testing procedures used. The variable that measures the systematic covariance risk of a particular share is obtained from a first-pass regression of the individual company returns on a market index. Hence it can be regarded at best as an approximation to the perceived systematic risk, subject to the margin of error inevitable in any sampling process, if to nothing else. The presence of such errors of approximation will inevitably weaken the apparent association between mean returns and measured systematic risk in the critical second-pass tests." constructs the model. Section 4 reports the quantitative results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Stylized Facts
Section 2.1 presents the evidence on the CAPM performance, and Section 2.2 on the beta anomaly. Table 1 reports the monthly CAPM regressions for the ten book-to-market deciles and the valueminus-growth decile in the U.S. data. The monthly returns data for the deciles, the value-weighted market portfolio, and the one-month Treasury bill rate are from Kenneth French's data library.
The CAPM Performance
Panel A shows that the CAPM fails to explain the value premium in the sample after July 1963, consistent with Fama and French (1992, 1993) . Moving from the growth decile to the value decile, the average excess return rises from 0.42% per month to 0.93%, and the average return spread (the value premium) is 0.51% (t = 2.75). Despite the nearly monotonic relation between book-to-market and average excess returns, the market beta is largely flat across the deciles. The value-minus-growth decile has only a tiny market beta of 0.01 (t = 0.07). Accordingly, its CAPM alpha is 0.51% (t = 2.26), which is identical in magnitude to the average value premium.
However, Panel B shows that the CAPM captures the value premium in the long sample from July 1926 to June 2014, consistent with Ang and Chen (2007) . The average excess returns vary from 0.57% per month for the growth decile to 1.09% for the value decile. The value premium is on average 0.52% (t = 2.60), which is close to that in the post-1963 sample. More important, the CAPM captures the average value premium, with an insignificant alpha of 0.23% (t = 1.18) and a significant market beta of 0.45 (t = 3.52). From Panel C, the CAPM also performs well from July 1926 to June 1963. The average value premium is still 0.52% per month, albeit insignificant (t = 1.31). The market beta is large, 0.74 (t = 5.33). As such, the CAPM alpha becomes negative, −0.11% (t = −0.34).
To shed light on the differences across the post-1963 sample and the long sample, Table 2 reports large market swings with market excess returns below 1.5 and above 98.5 percentiles of the empirical distribution, as well as the corresponding months and the value-minus-growth returns.
There are in total 32 such observations, 24 of which are from the Great Depression. When market excess returns are low, the value-minus-growth returns tend to be low, and when market excess returns are high, the value-minus-growth returns tend to be high. Their correlation is 0.73 across these observations. In particular, the lowest value premium is −22.67% in March 1938, which comes with an abysmally low market excess return of −23.80%. The highest value premium is 69.99% in August 1932, which comes with an exuberantly high market excess return of 36.41%.
More recently, following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the market excess return is −17.23% in October 2008, in which the value-minus-growth return is −11.93%. in red the observations with monthly market excess returns below 1.5 and above 98.5 percentiles of the empirical distribution. These observations clearly contribute to the market beta of 0.45 (t = 3.52) for the value-minus-growth decile in the long sample. In contrast, Panel B shows that large swings in the stock market are scarce in the post-1963 sample, giving rise to a flat regression line. In all, the CAPM does a good job in explaining the value premium in the long sample that includes the Great Depression, but that the CAPM fails in the short post-1963 sample.
While large swings in the stock market have a large impact on the performance of the CAPM, its relative success in the long sample is robust to extreme observations. Table 3 evaluates the robustness of the long-term performance of the CAPM to extreme observations. From Panel A, even after we remove the observations with extreme 3% of market excess returns, the CAPM continues to do well with an alpha of 0.17% per month (t = 0.81) and a market beta of 0.20 (t = 2.54) for the value-minus-growth decile. However, its average return, 0.30%, is only marginally significant.
Removing extreme 10% observations of market excess returns, we obtain an average value premium of 0.43% (t = 2.72), an insignificant alpha of 0.28%, and a significant beta of 0.20. 4 4 Somewhat surprisingly, only after we remove 50% of market excess returns, do we observe a significant alpha 2.2 The Beta Anomaly Fama and French (2006) refute the Ang and Chen (2007) evidence that the CAPM captures the value premium in the long sample, and argue that the CAPM's problem is that cross-sectional variation in the market beta goes unrewarded. This flat relation between market betas and average returns, known as the beta anomaly, has a long tradition in empirical finance (Fama and MacBeth (1973); Fama and French (1992, 1993) ; Frazzini and Pedersen 2014). Table 4 presents the evidence.
At the end of June of each year t, we sort all stocks into deciles based on the NYSE breakpoints of pre-ranking betas, which are estimated from rolling-window regressions of firm-level excess returns on the market excess returns in the prior 60 months (24 months minimum). We calculate value-weighted decile returns, and the deciles are rebalanced in June. Table 4 reports the average returns and the CAPM regressions for the market beta deciles. The sample starts in July 1928 because we use the data from the first two years to estimate the pre-ranking betas in June of 1928.
Panel A shows that, contradicting the CAPM, the relation between market betas and average returns in the post-1963 sample is largely flat. Moving from the low to high beta decile, the average excess return rises from 0.51% per month to 0.63%, and the spread of only 0.12% is within 0.5 standard errors from zero. More important, the pre-ranking beta sorts yield a large spread in the post-ranking beta, 1.04 (t = 11.41), across the extreme deciles. As a result, the CAPM alpha for the high-minus-low decile is large and negative, −0.40%, albeit insignificant (t = −1.48).
Panel B reports the evidence from the long sample. The average excess return rises from 0.57% per month for the low beta decile to only 0.81% for the high beta decile. The average return spread of 0.24% is within one standard error from zero. More important, the post-ranking beta moves from 0.57 to 1.70, and the spread of 1.12 is more than 18 standard errors from zero. As a result, the CAPM alpha for the high-minus-low beta decile is significantly negative, −0.47% (t = −2.40).
of 0.56% per month (t = 2.18) for the value-minus-growth decile. The average return is 0.63% (t = 3.33), and the market beta is 0.07 (t = 0.53). As such, the CAPM performs well in the long sample, and the risk related to the Great Depression is priced in the value-minus-growth decile, even after the extreme observations are removed (perhaps because of investor expectations of the disaster risk).
Panel C reports largely similar evidence for the pre-1963 sample. The average return for the highminus-low beta decile is 0.40% (t = 0.88), and its post-ranking beta is 1.18 (t = 16.04). The CAPM alpha is large, −0.56%, albeit only marginally significant (t = −1.94).
An Investment Model with Disasters
We construct our model by combining elements from the investment model of Zhang (2005) and Cooper (2006) and the disaster model of Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006 Barro ( , 2009 .
Environment
The economy consists of a representative agent with the Epstein-Zin (1989) utility and heterogenous firms. The firms take the representative agent's intertemporal rate of substitution as given when determining their optimal policies. The production technology is subject to both aggregate and firm-specific shocks. The aggregate shock contains a disaster state as well as a recovery state.
The Pricing Kernel
The representative agent has the recursive utility, U t , defined over aggregate consumption, C t :
in which ι is the time discount factor, ψ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and γ is the relative risk aversion. The pricing kernel is given by:
Consumption Dynamics
The log consumption growth, denoted g ct ≡ log(C t /C t−1 ) is specified as:
in which g t follows a first-order autoregressive process per Mehra and Prescott (1985) . Specifically,
in which t+1 is a standard normal shock, and the unconditional mean of g t is zero.
After calibrating the parameter values of ρ g (0.6) and σ g (0.0025) to the consumption growth data in normal times (Section 4.1), we use the Rouwenhorst (1995) procedure to discretize g t into a grid with five values {g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 , g 5 }. A low value of 0.6 for ρ g means that the five-point grid provides an accurate approximation for the continuous process in equation (4) (Tauchen and Hussey 1991; Kopecky and Suen 2010) . The discretization also produces a transition matrix, P , given by: 
in which p ij , for i, j = 1, . . . , 5, is the probability of g t+1 = g j conditional on g t = g i .
To incorporate disaster risk into the model, we modify directly the discretized g t grid and its transition matrix, following Danthine and Donaldson (1999) . In particular, we insert into the g t grid a disaster state, g 0 = λ D , in which λ D < 0 is the disaster size, as well as a recovery state, g 6 = λ R , in which λ R > 0 is the recovery size. Accordingly, we form the transition matrix, P , by modifying P to incorporate the disaster and recovery states as follows:
In the modified transition matrix, η is the probability of entering the disaster state from any of the normal states, and θ is the probability of remaining in the disaster state next period conditional on the economy being in the disaster state in the current period. As such, θ is the persistence of the disaster state. Similarly, ν is the persistence of the recovery state. In addition, in constructing the transition matrix, we have implicitly assumed that the economy can only enter the recovery state following a disaster. Once in the recovery state, the economy can enter any of the normal states with an equal probability, (1 − ν)/5, but cannot fall immediately back into the disaster state.
Finally, we emphasize that our model retains only one aggregate state, g t , in the economy.
Production
Firms produce output with capital, and are subject to both aggregate and firm-specific shocks.
Operating profits, Π it ≡ Π(K it , Z it , X t ), for firm i are given by:
in which ξ > 0 is the curvature parameter, X t is the aggregate productivity, Z it is the firm-specific productivity, and K it is capital. The fixed costs of production are f K it , with f > 0, and are scaled by capital to ensure that these costs do not become trivially small along the balanced growth path.
The aggregate productivity growth, g xt ≡ log(X t /X t−1 ), is linked to the consumption growth:
in which φ > 0. The firm-specific productivity for firm i, Z it , has a transition function given by:
in which z it ≡ log Z it , z is the unconditional mean of z it common to all firms, and e it+1 is an independently and identically distributed standard normal shock. We assume that e it+1 and e jt+1 are uncorrelated for any i = j, and t+1 and e it+1 are uncorrelated for all i.
Our modeling of disasters as large drops in consumption, output, and total factor productivity is motivated by Barro (2006) , Barro and Ursua (2008) , and Nakamura, Steinsson, Barro and Ursua (2013) , who document direct evidence on consumption and output disasters in a historical, cross-country panel. Ohanian (1999, 2007) show that negative shocks to total factor productivity can account for over half of the 1929-1933 downturn in the Great Depression in the United
States. More generally, the studies collected in Kehoe and Prescott (2007) show that productivity shocks play an important role during economic disasters for different countries around the world.
Adjustment Costs
Let I it denote firm i's investment at time t. Capital accumulates as follows:
in which δ is the rate of depreciation. Capital investment entails asymmetric adjustment costs:
in which a − > a + > 0 and c − > c + > 0 capture nonconvex adjustment costs (Cooper 2006) .
Value Maximization, Entry and Exit
Upon observing current period productivity levels X t and Z it , firm i makes optimal investment decision, I it , and optimal exit decision, χ it , to maximize its market value of equity. Let
The cum-dividend market value of equity, V it , is given by:
in which s > 0 is the liquidation value parameter, subject to the capital accumulation equation (10).
When V it ≥ sK it , which is the exit threshold, firm i stays in the economy, i.e., χ it = 0. For all the incumbent firms, evaluating the value function at the optimum yields
Equivalently,
is the stock return,
] is the true beta, and
] is the price of risk.
When V it < sK it , firm i exits from the economy at the beginning of time t, i.e., χ it = 1. We set its stock return from the beginning of period t − 1 to the beginning of t, R it , to be a predetermined delisting return. Shumway (1997) shows that the average delisting return is −30% for stocks on New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange. Shumway and Warther (1999) show that the average delisting return is −55% for stocks on National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations. We set the delisting return to be −42.5%, which is the average estimate.
In any event, the delisting return has little impact on our quantitative results (Section 4.4.4).
When firm i exits from the economy at the beginning of time t, we assume that it enters an immediate reorganization process. The current shareholders of the firm receive sK it as the liquidation value and leaves, and the old firm ceases to exit. New shareholders take over the remainder of
is the reorganization cost parameter. For computational tractability, we assume that the reorganization process occurs instantaneously. At the beginning of t, the old firm is replaced by a new firm with an initial capital of (1 − s − κ)K it owned by new shareholders. The new firm draws a firm-specific log productivity, z it , from its unconditional distribution, which is normal with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of σ z / 1 − ρ 2 z .
Our modeling of entry and exit keeps the number of firms constant in the economy.
Our model is partial equilibrium in nature in that we do not impose the aggregate resource constraint that consumption equals aggregate profits minus aggregate investment minus aggregate adjustment costs. Closing the economy per general equilibrium would increase the computational burden exponentially because the cross-sectional distribution of firms becomes an infinite-dimensional state variable. In addition, closing the economy would require us to confront the equity premium puzzle in a production economy with disasters. 5 Our objective is more modest. Building on studies on disasters in endowment economies, we specify exogenous consumption dynamics to fit the equity premium. Taking the aggregate risk premium as given, we focus on examining the endogenous behavior of the cross section of expected returns.
Computation
Because the model features a balanced growth path, we first detrend the model before solving for its stationary equilibrium. We define the following stationary variables:
We then rewrite the model's key equations in terms of the detrended, stationary variables:
• The utility-to-consumption ratio:
• The pricing kernel:
• Profits:
• Capital accumulation:
• The adjustment costs function:
• Dividends:
• The value function, V it ≡ V K it , Z it , X t /X t−1 :
• The stock return for an incumbent firm:
To solve for the pricing kernel, we iterate on the log utility-to-consumption ratio, u t ≡ log( U t ):
as a function of g t . The pricing kernel can then be rewritten as:
We iterate on the following recursion to compute the value and policy functions: 6
4 Quantitative Results 
Calibration
We calibrate the model in monthly frequency. Table 5 reports the parameter values for the benchmark calibration. For the preference parameters, we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ψ, to be 1.5 as in Bansal and Yaron (2004) . The relative risk aversion, γ, is five. The time discount factor, ι, is set to be 0.99035 to generate an average risk free rate about 1.8% per annum.
For the parameters that govern the consumption dynamics in normal times, we set the average growth rate, g, to be 0.019/12, the persistence ρ g = 0.6, and the conditional volatility σ g = 0.0025 to be consistent with the data of per capita real consumption (nondurables and services) growth from 1947 to 2013. The quarterly and annual consumption data are from National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) Table 7 .1. The implied consumption growth volatility is 1.43% per annum in simulated quarterly data, and is not far from 1.02% in the real data. In simulated annual data, the consumption growth volatility is 1.7%, which is not far from 1.25% in the real data. 7 The first-order autocorrelation is 0.49 in simulated quarterly data and 0.26 in simulated annual data. While the former is higher than 0.30 in the real quarterly data, the latter is lower than 0.49 in the real annual data.
For the parameters that govern the disaster dynamics, we set the disaster persistence, θ = 0.97, which is the probability that the economy remains in the disaster state in the next month conditional on it being in the disaster state in the current month. This monthly persistence accords with the quarterly persistence of 0.97 3 = 0.914 in Gourio (2012). As such, the average duration of disasters is 1/(1−0.97) = 33 months (roughly three years), consistent with Barro and Ursua (2008) .
We set the disaster probability η to be 0.028/12, which implies an annual disaster probability of 2.8% estimated in Nakamura, Steinsson, Barro and Ursua (2013) . Gourio uses a quarterly disaster probability of 0.72%, also consistent with an annual probability of 2.8%.
We still have three disaster parameters remaining, including the disaster size, λ D , the recovery size, λ R , and the recovery persistence, ν. We experiment with different values so that the impulse response of log consumption to a disaster shock in the model mimics that in the data as in Nakamura, Steinsson, Barro and Ursua (2013) . This procedure yields λ D = −0.0275, λ R = 0.0325, and ν = 0.95. Figure 2 reports that the model's impulse response is largely comparable with that in the data. The maximum short-term effect of disasters in the model is a fall of about 23% in log consumption, which is somewhat smaller than 29% in the data reported by Nakamura et al. (Table 2 ). The long-term negative effect is 15% fall in log consumption, which is close to 14% in the data.
The remaining parameters govern the various technologies in the economy. We set the curvature parameter in the production function, ξ = 0.65, which is close to the estimate of Hennessy and Whited (2007) . The monthly depreciation rate, δ, is 0.01, which implies an annual rate of 12% as estimated by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) . The persistence, ρ z , and conditional volatility, σ z , of the firm-specific productivity are set to be 0.985 and 0.5, respectively, which are somewhat larger than the corresponding values in Zhang (2005) after adjusting for the curvature parameter ξ. We do so to enlarge the cross-sectional dispersion of firms. The long-run mean of log firm-specific productivity,z, is −9.75, so that the long-run average detrended capital is around unity in simulations.
We set the liquidation parameter, s = 0, meaning that shareholders receive nothing in the event of bankruptcy. The reorganizational cost parameter, κ, is 0.25. The leverage for the aggregate productivity, φ, is set to be unity to generate an annual output growth volatility of 2.43% in normal times. This volatility is close to 2.30% in the data, in which output is the per capita real gross domestic product from 1947 to 2013 (NIPA Table 7 .1). Finally, we set the adjustment cost parameters a + = 0.035, a − = 0.05, c + = 75, c − = 150, and the fixed costs parameter, f = 0.005. Because of the lack of direct evidence on their values, we calibrate these parameters to match the properties of the book-to-market deciles. Section 4.4 contains extensive comparative statics to evaluate the quantitative impact of these parameter values on our key results.
Explaining the Performance of the CAPM
We simulate 2,000 artificial samples from the model, each with 5,000 firms and 1, 500 months. We start each simulation by setting the initial capital stocks of all firms at unity and by drawing their firm-specific productivity from the unconditional distribution of Z it . We drop the first 444 months to neutralize the impact of the initial condition. The remaining 1, 056 months of simulated data are treated as those from the economy's stationary distribution. The sample size is comparable to the period from July 1926 to June 2014 in the real data (Table 1) . We calculate the model moments on each artificial sample and report cross-simulation averaged results. Table 6 reports the key results under the benchmark calibration. Panel A shows the CAPM regressions for ten book-to-market deciles in the samples with at least one disaster episode (1,847 out of 2,000 samples). The average returns of the deciles increase with book-to-market from 0.74%
per month for the growth decile to 1.19% for the value decile. The average value-minus-growth return is 0.45% per month, which is not far from 0.52% in the data (Table 1 , Panel A). However, despite the lower value premium in the model, its t-statistic is 5.83, which is more than twice as large as 2.60 in the data. As such, the volatility of the value-minus-growth returns in the model is less than one half of that in the data. Similarly, the t-statistics for the individual deciles in the model are more than three times larger than those in the data. As such, stock return volatilities in the model are lower than those in the data, in line with the aggregate results in Barro (2006 Barro ( , 2009 . 8
The CAPM captures the value premium in the model's artificial samples with disasters. The value-minus-growth alpha is −0.21% (t = −1.72), and its 95% confidence interval across simulations spans from −0.46% to 0.06%. Accordingly, the market beta is estimated to be 0.82 (t = 6.82). The beta also aligns monotonically with book-to-market, rising from 0.82 for the growth decile to 1.64 for the value decile. Panel B reports the CAPM regressions for the book-to-market deciles in the samples without disasters (153 out of 2,000 samples). The average returns continue to align monotonically with book-to-market, going from 0.77% per month to 1.21%. The average return of the valueminus-growth decile, 0.45% per month, is identical to that from the disaster samples. More important, Panel B shows that the CAPM fails badly in the no-disaster samples. The CAPM regression of the value-minus-growth decile yields an alpha of 0.47% (t = 3.71). The 95% confidence interval for the alpha spans from 0.22% to 0.75%. In addition, the market beta for the value-minus-growth decile is insignificantly negative, −0.03 (t = −0.24). Finally, the R 2 is in effect zero. In all, the quan-titative results in Table 6 on the CAPM regressions are largely aligned with the evidence in Table 1 .
Inspecting the Mechanism
What is the driving force behind the quantitative results in Table 6 ? To shed light on this important issue, we first show that value stocks are more exposed to disaster risk than growth stocks. We then illustrate how the disaster risk is reflected in the CAPM regressions of the value-minus-growth returns. Finally, we examine how the disaster risk induces strong nonlinearity in the pricing kernel.
The Impact of Disaster Risk on Firm-level Risk and Risk Premiums
We characterize the impact of disaster risk using the model's solution and impulse responses. First, we use the model's solution on the K it -g t -z it grid to plot the true beta, β M it , and the expected risk premium, E t [R it+1 ] − r f t , against the detrended capital, K it , and the log firm-specific productivity,
To examine the impact of disaster risk, we make the plots for two values of the detrended consumption growth, g t , including the disaster state, λ D , and the mean of normal states (zero).
Panel A in Figure 3 shows that in disasters, low-z firms, which tend to be value firms, are substantially riskier than high-z firms, which tend to be growth firms. Accordingly, Panel B shows that low-z firms earn substantially higher risk premiums than high-z firms in the disaster state. In contrast, Panels C and D show that risk and risk premiums are largely flat across firms in the normal states. Also, in each panel, only a portion of the K it -z it grid is plotted. This missing region is where firms exit the economy. Naturally, low-z firms are more likely to exit than high-z firms. In addition, because the fixed costs of production are proportional to capital, high-K firms are more likely to exit than low-K firms. In simulations, value firms tend to have lower z but higher K than growth firms.
We also quantify the impact of disaster via impulse responses. We simulate the economy for 150,000 months, a period that contains slightly more than 300 disaster episodes. An episode starts with the economy switching from a normal state to the disaster state, and ends with it switching from the recovery state to a normal state. We trace the responses in risk and risk premiums for 25 years after an initial disaster shock, and calculate the average responses across the disaster episodes. Figure 4 reports the mean responses for the value decile, the growth decile, and the averages across all ten book-to-market deciles. From Panel A, the true value beta jumps up by 0.37, and the true growth beta up by almost 0.20, in response to a disaster shock. To get a sense of the magnitude, the long-term average is around 0.04 for the value beta and 0.02 for the growth beta. As such, disasters cause an enormous jump in risk, more so for value than for growth firms. Accordingly, Panel B shows that in response to a disaster shock, the expected risk premium of the value decile jumps up by more than 400% over the subsequent two years, and that of the growth decile up by almost 100% over the same period. Again, to get a sense of the magnitude, the long-term average is about 15% per annum for the value decile and 9% for the growth decile. In all, consistent with the evidence in Section 2, value stocks are more exposed to disaster risk than growth stocks in our model.
Intuitively, the economic mechanism is similar qualitatively to, but more powerful quantitatively than that in Zhang (2005) and Cooper (2006) . Because of asymmetric adjustment costs, value firms are burdened with more unproductive capital, finding it more difficult to downsize than growth firms. As such, value firms are riskier than growth firms in bad times. In contrast, in normal times, even value firms do not have strong incentives to disinvest. As such, the asymmetry mechanism fails to take strong effect, giving rise to weak spreads in risk and risk premiums across firms. While prior studies describe the working of this mechanism in recessions, we extend it to rare disasters.
The working of the asymmetry mechanism is related to our modeling of disasters as large drops in consumption, output, and total factor productivity. In addition to productivity disasters, Gourio (2012) also models disasters via capital destruction, which would seem to weaken the asymmetry mechanism illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 . However, while capital destruction is realistic for wars, it seems less obvious for economic disasters. Because we aim to explain the stylized facts (Section 2)
that feature the important impact of the Great Depression, which is an economic disaster, we opt to not model capital destruction. Perhaps more important, Gourio motivates capital destruction in disasters as large, negative shocks on the "quality" of capital: "Perhaps it is not the physical capital but the intangible capital (customer and employee value) that is destroyed during prolonged economic depressions (p. 2740)." The accumulation of a large quantity of capital with deteriorating quality in disasters would instead work to strengthen our asymmetry mechanism.
Nonlinearity in the CAPM Regressions
The disaster risk has important implications on the CAPM regressions. Figure 5 reports the scatter plots for the CAPM regressions of the value-minus-growth decile. Panel A is the scatter plot from stacking the simulated data for all the 1,847 out of 2,000 artificial samples (the same samples used in Table 6 ) with at least one disaster episode. Panel B is the scatter plot from stacking the simulated data for the remaining 153 samples without disasters.
The basic patterns mimic those in Figure 1 based on the long U.S. sample. From Panel A of Figure 5 , the value premium covaries strongly with market excess returns in the disaster samples.
Both returns are large and negative in disasters, and large and positive in the subsequent recoveries. As a result, the market beta for the value-minus-growth decile is 0.86, which is a population moment because of the large number of simulations. However, the CAPM alpha is −0.24% per month, meaning that the CAPM does not hold exactly in our dynamic single-factor model, even though the CAPM alpha is insignificant in finite samples (Table 6 , Panel A). 9
In contrast, Panel B of Figure 5 shows that the value premium does not covary at all with market excess returns in artificial samples with no disasters. Without the large swings in the same direction in the value premium and market excess returns in disasters as well as in subsequent recoveries, the CAPM regression line of the value premium is flat. As population moments, the market beta is in effect zero, and the CAPM alpha is 0.45% per month. This simulation result 9 The scatter plot in Panel A of Figure 5 shows three blocks, which, moving from left to right, represent disasters, normal times, and recoveries. The discreteness in blocks is due to the fact that we simulate directly from the discrete Markov chain with the transition probability matrix in equation (6). If we instead use a large number of grid points for normal states, the discreteness in blocks would disappear. However, as noted, because the persistence in consumption growth, ρ g , is low, 0.6, a five-point grid is sufficient to ensure accuracy for simulated moments from the model. reproduces the U.S. evidence from 1963 to 2014 (Figure 1, Panel B) .
Nonlinearity in the Pricing Kernel
The disaster risk induces strong nonlinearity in the pricing kernel, nonlinearity which in turn implies that the CAPM is a poor proxy of the pricing kernel. If the CAPM holds exactly, the pricing kernel can be expressed as a linear function of the market excess return, R M t+1 , i.e., M t+1 = l 0 + l 1 R M t+1 , in which l 0 and l 1 are constants (Cochrane 2005) . Panels C and D of Figure 5 show that the pricing kernel in the model is far from a linear function of the market excess returns.
Panel C reports the scatter plot for regressing the pricing kernel on the market excess returns based on the disaster samples. The regression yields a slope of −0.35 but an R 2 of only 25%, despite the model's single-factor structure. The linear CAPM fits poorly the observations from the disaster state, with very high realizations of the pricing kernel (marginal utilities), and the observations from the recovery state, with very low realizations of the pricing kernel. Despite the poor fit, the CAPM still manages to largely explain the value premium in time series regressions on the disaster samples.
More important, Panel D shows that the CAPM is an even worse proxy for the pricing kernel in the no-disaster samples. The slope from regressing the pricing kernel on the market excess return is only −0.03, falling in magnitude from −0.35 from the disaster samples. The R 2 drops from 25% to 11%. As a result, the CAPM fails badly in explaining the value premium in the no-disaster samples.
Comparative Statics
To gain further insights into the working of the key mechanism, we conduct comparative static experiments on a wide array of parameters. We group the parameters into three categories: (i) disaster dynamics: the disaster size, λ D , the disaster persistence, θ, the disaster probability, η, the recovery persistence, ν, and the recovery size, ν; (ii) technology: the adjustment costs parameters, a + , a − , c + , and c − , the curvature in production, ξ, the fixed costs parameter, f , the productivity growth leverage, φ, the liquidation value parameter, s, the reorganizational costs parameter, κ, and the delisting return, R; as well as (iii) preferences: the risk aversion, γ, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ψ. In each experiment, we only vary one parameter, while keeping all the others unchanged from the benchmark calibration. The only exception is that, when necessary, we adjust the time discount factor, ι, to pin the average interest rate at around 1.8% per annum. Finally, for each parameter, we consider two values, with one above and the other below the benchmark value.
Disaster Dynamics
From the first four columns in the upper panel of Table 7 , increasing the disaster size and persistence raises the value premium, and worsens the failure of the CAPM in samples without disasters. Intuitively, a higher magnitude for λ D and θ strengthens the nonlinear disaster dynamics, making the linear CAPM an even poorer proxy for the pricing kernel, especially in normal times. The effect of raising the disaster probability, η, goes in the same direction, but its quantitative impact is minimal.
Intuitively, η mainly determines the percentage of samples with at least one disaster episode out of 2,000 simulations. This percentage is 92% in the benchmark calibration with η = 0.23%, and 74% with η = 0.13% and 97% with η = 0.33%. However, conditional on at least one disaster appearing in a given sample, the nonlinear dynamics are mostly governed by the disaster size and persistence.
The recovery size and persistence have little impact on the magnitude of the value premium and the performance of the CAPM. Intuitively, risk and risk premiums are mostly determined by the model's dynamics in bad times, particularly rare disasters, in which the representative agent's marginal utilities are the highest. In contrast, in the recovery state, in which marginal utilities are at their lowest level, the risk and risk premium spreads between value and growth firms are tiny.
Technology: Adjustment Costs
The last eight columns in the upper panel of Table 7 report the comparative statics with the four adjustment costs parameters. The upward nonconvex costs parameter, a + , and its downward counterpart, a − , work in the opposite direction. While increasing a + reduces the value premium and its CAPM alpha in normal times, increasing a − does the opposite. The a − effect works through the asymmetry mechanism. A high value of a − means that value firms face a higher hurdle in reducing their unproductive capital, giving rise to higher risk and risk premiums.
Why does the upward nonconvex costs parameter, a + , work differently? Intuitively, firms disinvest very infrequently. In a typical simulation, only 0.5% of the firm-month observations have negative investment. Such a low disinvestment frequency means that a + is the main parameter that determines the magnitude of nonconvex costs of adjustment, a + K it . A lower value of a + means that firms would in general have higher capital, including value firms. When a disaster hits, value firms would be burdened with more unproductive capital, reinforcing the asymmetry mechanism.
As such, a lower a + value increases the value premium and its CAPM alpha in no-disaster samples.
The upward convex costs parameter, c + , works in the same direction as its downward counterpart, c − . A higher value of c − restricts the flexibility of value firms in reducing their unproductive capital. Although applying to positive investment, c + also limits value firms in adjusting their capital. However, the c + effect works in the opposite direction as the a + effect. The crux is that c + involves quadratic adjustment costs, which do not reduce capital as directly as a + in nonconvex costs.
Technology: Production
From the first two columns in the lower panel of Table 7 , decreasing the curvature in the production function by increasing ξ from 0.6 to 0.7 raises the value premium and the market beta of the value-minus-growth decile, especially in disaster samples. Intuitively, the sensitivity of profits to the aggregate productivity is
t . In general, the relation between this sensitivity and ξ is ambiguous. However, the relation tends to be positive for value firms with high K it and low Z it , but negative for growth firms with low K it and high Z it . Also, the relation is more likely to be positive when X t is particularly low, as in disasters.
The next two columns in the lower panel show that reducing the fixed costs parameter, f , increases the value premium and its CAPM alpha in the no-disaster samples. At first glance, this result seems to contradict prior studies that show higher fixed costs tend to imply a higher value premium. The crux is that the fixed costs are proportional to capital in our economy with balanced growth, whereas the fixed costs are constant, independent of capital, in prior studies. While the constant fixed costs work as operating leverage in prior studies, the fixed costs work in a similar way as the upward nonconvex costs of adjustment, a + , in our model.
Increasing the productivity growth leverage, φ, raises the value premium and its CAPM alpha in normal times. Intuitively, a higher φ implies a proportionally larger aggregate shock, including in the disaster state. More severe disasters in aggregate productivity increases the value premium, and strengthens the disaster dynamics, giving rise to a higher CAPM alpha in the no-disaster samples.
Technology: Liquidation
The next three technological parameters involve entry and exit, including the liquidation value parameter, s, the reorganizational costs parameter, κ, and the delisting return, R. Increasing s reduces the value premium and its CAPM alpha in no-disaster samples. Intuitively, in the event of exit, existing shareholders extract a higher liquidation value of sK it , which is in effect a free abandonment option, acting as an insurance hedge against the disaster risk. The abandonment option is especially attractive for shareholders of value firms, which tend to have more unproductive capital than growth firms. Consequently, instead of facing asymmetric adjustment costs in disasters, the shareholders opt to exit, thereby reducing the risk for value firms relative to growth firms. In contrast to the strong s effect, the impact of the reorganizational costs parameter and the delisting return is quantitatively negligible. With s = 0, the percentage of exit firms is only about 0.09% in simulations.
Preferences
The last four columns in the lower panel report the results for the risk aversion, γ, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ψ. Not surprisingly, increasing either parameter strengthens the nonlinear disaster dynamics, raising the value premium and its CAPM alpha in no-disaster samples.
Explaining the Beta Anomaly
Our model is also largely consistent with the flat beta-return relation.
Quantitative Results
Mimicking the empirical procedure in Table 4 , we sort stocks in simulated panels at the end of each June based on pre-ranking market betas from prior 60-month rolling windows. We calculate value-weighted decile returns, and rebalance the deciles in June. Panel A of Table 8 shows that in artificial samples with disasters, the average excess return rises from 0.76% per month for the low rolling beta decile only to 0.79% for the high decile, and the spread of 0.04% is within 0.5 standard errors from zero. The pre-ranking market beta sorts also yield a spread in the post-ranking betas, although its magnitude, 0.30 (t = 2.49), is smaller than that in the data. The CAPM alpha of the high-minus-low decile is −0.21%, albeit insignificant (t = −1.73).
From Panel B, results on the beta anomaly from the no-disaster samples are even stronger.
The low-beta decile earns on average 0.80% per month, which is even higher than 0.74% for the high-beta decile, although the small spread of −0.06% is insignificant (t = −0.93). Relative to the disaster samples, sorting on pre-ranking betas in the no-disaster samples yields an even larger spread in post-ranking betas, 0.47, which is almost 3.5 standard errors from zero. As a result, the CAPM alpha for the high-minus-low beta decile is significantly negative, −0.44% (t = −3.49).
The Importance of Measurement Errors
It is perhaps surprising that our risk-based model can reproduce the flat beta-return relation in simulations. The crux is that the rolling market beta contains a great deal of measurement errors, and is, consequently, a poor proxy for the true market beta. Because of our single-factor structure, all aggregate variables are conditionally perfectly correlated, including the pricing kernel and the expected market risk premium, E t [R M t+1 ] − r f t . As such, the conditional CAPM holds in theory (but not the unconditional CAPM), meaning that the true market beta can be backed out as
It should be noted that the true market beta differs from the true beta with respect to the pricing kernel, β M it , which is calculated as (E t [R it+1 ] − r f t )/λ M t . Table 8 show that, not surprisingly, sorting on true market betas yields large average return spreads, over 1.2% per month, across extreme deciles in the model. The static CAPM fails to price these deciles both in the disaster and no-disaster samples. In the disaster samples (Panel C), the post-ranking rolling betas overshoot, giving rise to a negative CAPM alpha of −0.73% (t = −1.98). In the no-disaster samples (Panel D), the rolling betas move in the opposite direction as the true market betas, with a spread of −1.23 (t = −11.21). Accordingly, the CAPM alpha is 2.23% (t = 21.52), which is substantially higher than the average return spread of 1.22%.
Panels C and D in
To illustrate measurement errors in rolling market betas, Figure 6 presents the scatter plots of true market betas against their corresponding rolling betas, using deciles formed on rolling market betas as the testing portfolios. In both the disaster and no-disaster samples, these deciles show substantial variations in rolling betas, but only small variations in true market betas. The correlation between the true and rolling market betas is weakly negative, −0.03, in the disaster samples, but strongly negative, −0.35, in the no-disaster samples. Panels C and D present the scatter plots using deciles formed on true market betas as the testing portfolios. Rolling market betas remain a poor proxy for true market betas. Their correlation is weakly positive, 0.08, in the disaster samples, but reliably negative, −0.20, in the no-disaster samples. It is surprising how poor the estimated rolling betas are as a proxy for true market betas, especially in the no-disaster samples.
Intuitively, based on 60-month rolling windows, the estimated rolling betas are basically prior five-year averaged betas. In contrast, true market betas accurately and immediately reflect changes in aggregate and firm-specific conditions. Within a given rolling window, true market betas can even mean-revert, giving rise to opposite rankings in rolling betas. Our quantitative results in the context of the beta anomaly add to a substantial body of simulation evidence on the importance of beta measurement errors in asset pricing tests. 10 In all, we suggest that the evidence on the beta anomaly in the real data should be interpreted with extreme caution.
Conclusion
Rare disasters can explain the value premium puzzle that value stocks earn higher average returns than growth stocks, despite their similar market betas. In an investment model with disasters, we show that value stocks are more exposed to disaster risk than growth stocks. More important, the disaster risk induces strong nonlinearity in the pricing kernel. In finite samples, in which disasters are materialized, the CAPM does an adequate job in accounting for the value premium. More important, in finite samples without disasters, estimated market betas fail to measure the higher exposures of value stocks to disasters than growth stocks. This nonlinearity allows the model to replicate the failure of the CAPM in the post-1963 sample. In addition, due to severe measurement errors in rolling betas, the relation between pre-ranking market betas and average returns is flat in the model's simulations, despite a strong positive relation between true betas and expected returns.
As such, the model is also consistent with the beta anomaly. For each report the average excess return (m), the CAPM alpha, the market beta, their t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations, and the R 2 . "V−G" is the value-minus-growth decile. For each market beta decile, we report the average return (m), the CAPM alpha, the post-ranking market beta, their t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations, and the R 2 . "H" is the highest pre-ranking market beta decile, "L" the lowest decile, and "H−L" the high-minus-low decile. Results are averaged across 2,000 simulations. In each experiment, we vary one parameter, while keeping all the others unchanged from the benchmark calibration. For each parameter, for example, the disaster size, λ D , we consider two values, with one above, −0.03, and the other below, −0.025, the benchmark value, −0.0275. See Table 5 for the descriptions of the symbols. In simulated data, when the economy enters the disaster state, we calculate the cumulative drop in log consumption for 25 years after the impulse. Consumption is time-aggregated from the monthly to annual frequency. The impulse response is averaged across more than 20,000 disaster episodes. 
